The recent cyber operation by Chinese state-backed hackers—dubbed Salt Typhoon—is more than just a breach of critical U.S. infrastructure. It’s a calculated escalation in Beijing’s strategy to infiltrate America’s most sensitive systems, and this time, it isn’t just about data theft. The targets included major U.S. telecoms like Verizon, AT&T, and Lumen Technologies, and the hackers gained access to systems used for lawful wiretap requests, potentially exposing data on high-profile criminal and national security investigations. What makes this breach particularly dangerous is that Beijing isn’t just collecting information; it’s positioning itself to preempt and counter U.S. intelligence operations.
Here’s the alarming part: these systems don’t just handle run-of-the-mill surveillance—they are key to monitoring suspects involved in espionage and counterintelligence. This means that by infiltrating these networks, China could potentially see if any of their spies or assets in the U.S. are under federal investigation. They would be able to track which phone numbers are flagged, which targets are under surveillance, and perhaps even which federal agencies are leading the investigations. That’s not just valuable—it’s a golden ticket for Beijing’s counterintelligence efforts. If China can anticipate or neutralize U.S. law enforcement’s ability to monitor its operatives, it effectively blindsides the entire American intelligence apparatus.
This access also provides the ability to manipulate the data within these systems. Imagine if Beijing could remove or modify records, altering the course of an investigation or feeding disinformation into the very channels U.S. agencies rely on to prosecute espionage and cybersecurity cases. Such a capability could disrupt years of painstaking intelligence work and render entire investigations useless. In essence, this breach gives Beijing a potential lever to derail U.S. counterintelligence efforts from the inside.
What’s particularly chilling is that this wasn’t a lucky strike—it was deliberate. Salt Typhoon didn’t randomly target servers; they went after core infrastructure nodes designed to safeguard America’s most sensitive law enforcement and national security communications. By embedding themselves in these networks, they’ve created a digital “listening post” that could allow Beijing to detect when they’re being watched, anticipate U.S. moves, and pull their own agents out of harm’s way before the hammer falls. It’s a move that shifts the balance of power in counterintelligence and puts Beijing in a position to disrupt our defenses without ever setting foot on American soil.
FBI Director Christopher Wray has repeatedly warned about the sheer scale of China’s cyber capabilities. His latest estimates reveal that Chinese state-sponsored hackers outnumber FBI cyber personnel by a staggering ratio of 50 to 1 . This numerical advantage allows Beijing to not only conduct sophisticated intrusions like Salt Typhoon but also to flood the zone—overwhelming U.S. cybersecurity resources with relentless and coordinated campaigns across various sectors. And Salt Typhoon isn’t a one-off. It’s part of a broader, systematic effort by China to pre-position itself deep within American infrastructure. Previous campaigns, such as Volt Typhoon and Flax Typhoon, targeted U.S. power grids and water systems, aiming to disrupt civilian infrastructure during a conflict . Now, with Salt Typhoon, China has upped the ante by going straight for the networks that support America’s ability to conduct intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
This isn’t about embarrassing the United States—it’s about laying the groundwork to neutralize our ability to respond in a crisis. The Chinese government’s blanket denials and accusations of politicizing cybersecurity are par for the course. They’ve mastered the art of playing the victim on the global stage while simultaneously ramping up their own offensive cyber capabilities. Every time they get caught, Beijing deflects, denies, and then quietly resumes operations under a different guise. This is exactly how they’ve managed to stay ahead in the cyber domain. But with Salt Typhoon, the stakes are much higher. The potential exposure of active investigations into Chinese espionage could compromise not just sources and methods but also the very structure of U.S. counterintelligence.
What should Washington do? First, it’s time to go on offense. Congress must mandate that any telecom provider handling government data—whether related to national security or public safety—adopt zero-trust security frameworks with the highest level of encryption and monitoring. There must be stringent, real-time reporting requirements for any attempted intrusions, and the penalties for failing to secure these systems need to be severe enough to ensure compliance. Second, the scope of CFIUS must be expanded to scrutinize any tech partnerships or investments that could potentially be leveraged by Chinese intelligence. This includes outbound investments that often escape oversight but create long-term security risks.
Finally, it’s time to start imposing real costs on China’s cyber apparatus. Sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and targeted operations against Chinese cyber infrastructure should all be on the table. The U.S. must demonstrate that such brazen intrusions come with a steep price. The Salt Typhoon attack isn’t just another wake-up call—it’s a declaration that Beijing is willing to cross red lines we thought were secure. If we don’t act decisively now, we risk losing not just the digital battlefield, but the strategic high ground in a future conflict.
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