The next Congress has a rare opportunity to realign the Intelligence Community (IC) for a world defined by digital warfare, influence operations, and sophisticated state adversaries—not shadowy terror networks. But to do that, the IC needs to be stripped down, refocused, and recalibrated for 21st-century threats. This isn’t about expanding a bloated bureaucracy but about building a leaner, more agile intelligence apparatus that can operate effectively against the likes of China and Russia. That means eliminating waste, redefining roles, and investing in unified technology to ensure that every part of the IC is pulling in the same direction.
The first step is cutting through the bureaucratic bloat that has grown unchecked since the 2004 establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Created to improve coordination and eliminate the stovepipes that contributed to the failures before 9/11, ODNI has morphed into an unwieldy layer of oversight that complicates decision-making and disperses responsibility, as noted in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that have analyzed ODNI’s evolution and its current inefficiencies. The CIA and other IC agencies have also become bogged down by non-mission-related activities, making them less agile and more prone to bureaucratic inertia. A 2021 report from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence highlighted these overlapping responsibilities between ODNI and individual IC agencies, creating friction and confusion, and resulting in a duplication of effort that drains valuable resources and delays operational execution.
Congress should order a comprehensive audit of both ODNI and the broader IC. The goal should be to identify redundant layers, cut non-essential functions, and refocus resources on the most pressing national security priorities—countering strategic state threats, enhancing cyber capabilities, and strengthening human intelligence operations. Streamlining ODNI and the IC will ensure quicker decision-making and better alignment of strategic objectives, allowing the IC to operate with a single-minded focus on countering adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran. This recommendation aligns with findings from the Bipartisan Policy Center’s 2020 Review, which called for reducing redundancies and reallocating resources to counter China’s influence and Russia’s cyber threats.
The emphasis must be on making the IC nimble, not just “right-sized.” More authority and responsibility must be pushed to the front lines to enable decision-makers to respond faster to threats, reducing the bureaucratic delays that our adversaries exploit. This streamlined structure would also clarify the chain of command, reducing confusion and ensuring that every dollar and position is used for maximum impact.
But it’s not just about structure. Congress must also push for immediate upgrades to the IC’s digital infrastructure. Recent cyberattacks, like China’s Salt Typhoon, have highlighted the outdated and fragmented state of the IC’s digital backbone. Right now, different agencies operate on separate systems that are poorly integrated, making real-time data sharing and advanced AI integration nearly impossible. According to a Department of Defense (DoD) report, such fragmentation has left critical systems vulnerable and has hampered the IC’s ability to defend against sophisticated digital incursions like those seen in 2023’s Salt Typhoon and the earlier SolarWinds breach in 2020. Congress should approve a unified infrastructure investment across the entire IC—creating a shared digital backbone that links the CIA, NSA, FBI, and DHS. Such an investment would be far more than just an IT upgrade—it’s a strategic necessity that will enable the IC to leverage AI and machine learning as core operational tools rather than just standalone resources.
A unified infrastructure would facilitate complex multi-agency analyses, improve coordination, and enhance operational efficiency, allowing the IC to respond dynamically to rapidly evolving threats. When Beijing or Moscow escalates their influence operations or cyber-attacks, the IC should be able to detect, analyze, and counter these threats in real time—something it currently struggles to do. Despite nearly two decades of reform efforts since 9/11, critical intelligence is still locked away in agency silos, hobbling the community’s ability to respond effectively to fast-moving crises.
The concept for a Unified Cyber Command Center was originally proposed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and formalized within the U.S. Cyber Command and National Security Agency (NSA) frameworks as part of broader efforts to unify digital and cyber capabilities and reduce fragmentation in the command structure. Congress should build on this by establishing a Unified Intelligence Fusion Center that serves as a central hub for sharing intelligence on strategic threats across the IC.
This center should bring together analysts and operators from the CIA, NSA, FBI, and DHS, all working under one roof with a direct reporting line to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). It must have the authority to direct resources and personnel across agencies based on real-time intelligence needs, ensuring that crucial information flows seamlessly. Such a structure would enable faster, more coordinated responses to threats and ensure that the entire IC is operating as a cohesive unit rather than a collection of competing fiefdoms.
Internal inefficiencies across the broader IC are equally critical. Over the past decade, the expansion of DEIA (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility) initiatives has created a compliance-heavy culture that detracts from the IC’s operational focus. As detailed in a 2021 House Oversight Committee report, these initiatives have often turned into sprawling bureaucratic structures that emphasize ideological conformity over talent and skills. Agencies like the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have dedicated entire offices to DEIA compliance, resulting in a system that prioritizes social engineering over operational excellence.
Congress should demand a review of these programs to ensure they are not becoming ideological litmus tests that overshadow the IC’s core mission. Reforms must streamline DEIA initiatives to support the development of a cohesive, merit-based workforce that values skills and performance above superficial metrics. This is not just about trimming bureaucratic fat—it’s about refocusing the IC on what really matters: developing top-tier talent and cultivating a culture of operational excellence. The IC should be investing in the skills and technologies needed to counter China’s rapid advancements, not chasing ideological checkboxes.
The final piece of the puzzle is restoring clarity between the CIA and the Department of Defense (DoD) in irregular warfare and covert action operations. The Pentagon’s Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) has steadily encroached into areas that have long been the CIA’s domain, leading to confusion and a dilution of strategic focus. The DoD’s irregular warfare doctrine, which includes influence operations and unconventional warfare, has created operational overlaps that undermine both agencies’ effectiveness. As reported in the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, this confusion of roles has led to multiple failed operations and increased tensions between the Pentagon and Langley.
Congress must reassert the CIA’s primacy in these areas while leaving kinetic and direct military actions to the DoD. Revisiting the provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that define the Defense Clandestine Service’s role is a necessary step to prevent mission creep and restore clear civilian control over intelligence activities. Setting these boundaries isn’t just about turf wars; it’s about ensuring that each agency is tackling the right problems with the right tools, avoiding redundancy, and maintaining strategic focus.
The next Congress has a narrow window to realign the IC for a rapidly changing world. Without decisive action—cutting through bureaucratic bloat, eliminating mission overlap, investing in a unified digital infrastructure, and streamlining internal structures—the U.S. risks losing the intelligence edge it has held for decades. Beijing and Moscow are accelerating their capabilities while we remain bogged down by inefficiencies and internal disputes. The stakes have never been higher: America’s security, strategic influence, and technological superiority hang in the balance. It’s time to recalibrate the IC for a new era before our adversaries turn our own weaknesses into their greatest strengths.
Comments